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A SEVILLE STANDARD FOR AIDERS AND ABETTORS:
THE LOGIC AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE SUPREME
COURT'S DECISION IN CENTRAL BANK V. FIRST
INTERSTATE BANK

I. INTRODUCTION
In one of Cervantes' Exemplary Stories, a thief finds the city
of Seville so lax in safeguarding its citizens from criminals that
even he is scandalized.' Upon observing the impunity with which
the city has allowed an entire den of thieves to plunder, "he was
shocked by the slackness of the law in that famous city . . .where
such pernicious and perverted people could live almost openly."2
He thereupon resolved to seek a more respectable location as
quickly as possible.
In expressing indignance, albeit contrived, the thief was demonstrating a sensitivity to the role of law in society which, in a
recent decision, appears to have completely eluded the United
States Supreme Court. In Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank/
the Court held that aiders and abetters in private actions are now
exempt from liability under section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.' In so ruling, the Court has
departed from precedent as thoroughly, and as sweepingly, as it
has vitiated the Act's enforcement. This Comment will consider the
language and legislative history of the 1934 Act, the precedent established by both initial and later judicial decisions, the rationale
according to which the Supreme Court has departed from that

1. CERVANTES, EXEMPLARY STORIES 119 (C.A. Jones trans., Penguin Books 1972).
2. Id.
3. 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994), reversing First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891
(10th Cir. 1992). The litigation in Central Bank stemmed from the default of $11 million
in bonds for residential and commercial development.
4. See Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1983), 17

C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
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precedent, and the detrimental effects both of shielding aiders and
abetters from prosecution and of overhauling precedent in order to
do just that.
II.

THE

1934 ACT'S LANGUAGE AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Crafted at the beginning of the New Deal as a response to the
wild speculation that had ultimately overturned Wall Street, the
1934 Act has at once transcended its origins and retained its initially broad scope. The 1934 Act's tenth section is characteristic of
that scope. It defines conduct that "shall be unlawful for any person [to undertake] directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange." 5 Section 10(b) stipulates that:
It shall be unlawful [t]o use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security not so registered, any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission
may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.'
In introducing the bill that was ultimately to become the 1934
Act, Senator Fletcher, who chaired the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, left no doubt concerning the broad powers that
Congress was entrusting to the SEC. He declared that "[t]he Commission is .. .given power to forbid any other devices in connection with security transactions which it finds detrimental to the
public interest or to the proper protection of investors."7 One of
the principal draftsmen of the House version of the bill similarly
stressed his intention to make the language that was to become
section 10(b) as broad as possible in order to prevent "other cunning devices."'
Nor did the SEC refuse to act upon its authority. In 1942, it
fleshed out the 1934 Act with Rule lOb-5, according to which it is
unlawful . ..to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to

5. Securities and Exchange Act § 10(b) (emphasis added).

6. Id.
7. 78 CONG. REc. S2272 (daily ed. Feb. 9, 1934) (statement of Sen. Fletcher).
8. Hearing on H.R. 7852 and H.R. 8720 Before the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1934) (statement of Rep. Corcoran).
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defraud . . . to make any untrue statement of a material
fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made ... or ... to engage in any
act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person.'
III.

JUDICIAL HISTORY OF AIDER AND ABETTOR LIABILITY
PRIOR TO CENTRAL BANK

In view of the 1934 Act's broad language, circuit courts have
universally held defendants liable for aiding and abetting under
Rule lOb-5 in private actions."0 In each of 'these decisions, three
crucial elements have constituted the sine qua non for imposing

liability upon aiders and abettors: 1) a breach of the securities law
by a party other than the defendant;" 2) the aider and abettor's
knowledge of having advanced an improper activity; and 3)
some degree of significance of the aider and abettor's action in
advancing the primary activity. 3
In elucidating the second and third elements, the circuit courts
have imposed liability upon aiders and abettors according to two
"patterns."' 4 In SEC v. Coffey, 5 the court required a showing

9. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993).
10. Among the many decisions are Fine v. American Solar King Corp., 919 F.2d 290
(5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 913 (1991); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624
(8th Cir. 1985); Woods v. Barnett Bank, 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985); Cleary v.
Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774, 777 (1st Cir. 1983); Investors Research Group v. SEC,
628 F.2d 168, 178 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 919 (1980); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619
F.2d 909, 922 (2d Cir. 1980); Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793,
799 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978); Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84
(5th Cir. 1975); and Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d 139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that
defendant's acquiescence through silence in another party's fraudulent conduct, when combined with affirmative acts, constituted sufficient grounds for aiding and abetting), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
11. The court of appeals, in First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 898 (10th
Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.Ct. 1439 (1994), referred to this element as "the existence of a
primary violation of the securities laws by another."
12. Id.

13. The Pring court employed the language: "substantial assistance by the alleged aider-and-abettor in achieving the primary violation." Id. In its analysis of the three criteria,
the court also noted that the Seventh Circuit views the three criteria as added requirements beyond the plaintiff's demonstration "that the alleged aider-and-abettor committed a
proscribed 'manipulative or deceptive' act with the same scienter as for primary liability."
Id. at 899.
14. WILLIAM L. CARY & MELvIN A. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 885 (6th ed. 1988).
15. 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
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that "the accused party had general awareness that his role was
part of an overall [improper] activity and . . . knowingly and substantially assist[ed] the violation." 16 Then, in language suggesting
a difference of nuance between "knowledge" and "general awareness" rather than of substance, the liT v. Cornfeld7 court held
that, to impose liability, a court must find "'knowledge' of [the
primary] violation on the part of the aider and abettor; and ...
'substantial assistance' by the aider and abettor in the achievement
of the primary violation."' 8
Since mere "knowledge" or "general awareness" can be
grounds for liability, 9 silence or inaction may in and of themselves constitute aiding and abetting, even though the grounds upon
which liability may be imposed under such circumstances are
somewhat nebulous." Two commentators argue that "aiding and
abetting liability based on inaction can be predicated on either a
duty to act or a conscious intent to assist the wrongful act."' - In-

16. Id. at 1308. The Pring court also referred to this "general awareness" standard.
First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S. Ct. 1439
(1994).
17. 619 F.2d 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
18. Id. See also Armstrong v. McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
by exercising reasonable diligence shareholders could have discovered alleged fraudulent
conduct two years prior to complaint); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 784 (8th Cir.
1981) ("The scienter requirement scales upward when activity is more remote; therefore,
the assistance rendered should be both substantial and knowing"). Judge Friendly's opinion
in Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at 924, also suggests the possibility that the two tests in fact coalesce. According to that opinion:
Although [the tripartite] list of prerequisites has become commonplace, the exact
content of the rather vague phrases, especially 'knowledge' and 'substantial
assistance,' is still being delineated by the courts . . . . After studying the
many cases we might be inclined to wonder whether the elaborate discussions
have added anything except unnecessary detail to Judge L. Hand's famous
statement, made in a criminal context, that, in order to be held as an aider and
abettor, a person must 'in some sort associate himself with the venture, that he
participate in it as something that he wishes to bring about, that he seek by
his action to make it succeed.'
Id.
19. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits recently imposed a recklessness standard instead.
Levine v. Diamandthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1990); FDIC v. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1989). See infra notes 23-33 and accompanying text.
20. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 886. See also Landy v. FDIC, 486 F.2d
139, 162-63 (3d Cir. 1973) (holding that defendant's acquiescence through silence in
another party's fraudulent conduct, when combined with affirmative acts, constituted sufficient grounds for aiding and abetting liability), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 960 (1974).
21. CARY & EISENBERG, supra note 14, at 886.
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deed, according to the Court of Appeals in Pring, "[t]he weight of
authority is that even absent a duty to disclose, silence and inaction can be substantial assistance for aider and abettor liability
provided 'the defendant consciously intended to assist the primary

violation."

The Sixth,'

Eighth,24 and Ninth Circuits'

have added reck-

lessness as a third basis for aider and abettor liability. The court in
Herm v. Stafford conflated the concepts of "knowledge," "general

awareness," and "recklessness" 26 in holding a fast food franchise
operator and participant in investment scheme potentially liable for
misleading prospective investors by reading a press release that
contained materially false statements. 27 Other courts have also
adopted this formulation. In the Eighth Circuit, FDIC v. First Interstate Bank court28 held that "the evidence supports an inference
that [the defendant bank], with potential profits in mind, recklessly
chose to continue its relationship with the primary violator."'29 In
the Ninth Circuit, the court in Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc.3" held
a trust company liable for it "reckless disregard, if not actual
knowledge, of both [the corporation's] Rule lOb-5 violations and
the bank's role in the violations, together with the provisions of
substantial assistance by the bank in the violations."3
In all these decisions, the only real division among the courts

22. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994) (emphasis added) (citing Schneberger v. Wheeler, 859 F.2d 1477, 1480
(11th Cir. 1988); Moore v. Fenex, Inc., 809 F.2d 297, 303-304 (6th Cir. 1987); Monsen
v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978); Woodward v. Metro
Bank, 522 F.2d 84 (5th Cir. 1975)). See also Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th
Cir. 1985) ("an aider-abettor case predicated on inaction of the secondary party must meet
a high standard of intent"). As the Pring court noted, courts have evaluated actual intent
by determining "whether the alleged aider-and-abettor benefitted from such silence." Pring,
969 F.2d at 899. Cf DiLeo v. Ernst & Young, 901 F.2d 624, 629 (7th Cir. 1990) (the
test is whether "the defendant has thrown in his lot with the primary violators").
23. Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669 (6th Cir. 1981).
24. FDIC v. First Interstate Bank, 885 F.2d 423, 433-34 (8th Cir. 1989).
25. Levine v. Diamandthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1483 (9th Cir. 1990).
26. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (holding that "the term
'scienter' refers to a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud in
certain areas of the law" and that "[i]n certain areas of the law, recklessness is considered
to be a form of intentional conduct for the purpose of imposing liability for some act").
27. Hern, 663 F.2d at 684.
28. 885 F.2d 423, 433-33 (8th Cir. 1989).
29. Id. at 424-28. The facts of this case show an intersting similarity to those in Central Bank. See infra notes 35-53 and accompanying text.
30. 950 F.2d 1478 (9th Cir. 1990).
31. Id. at 1483.
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has concerned whether a finding of recklessness is sufficient to
establish scienter. For none of these courts, however, has there
been any question that aiders and abettors are liable in private
actions under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, and they have cited
reasons of precedent and public policy alike. 2 The desire to deter
securities fraud to the greatest possible extent is inextricable from
adherence to the goals that had animated Congress in the 1930s
and to which subsequent Congresses have adhered.3
IV.

THE FACTS AND ANALYSIS UNDERLYING THE APPELLATE
COURT'S DECISION IN FIRST INTERSTATE BANK V. PRING

In 1986 and 1988, the Colorado Springs-Stetson Hills Public
Building Authority (the Authority) issued bonds for $15 million
and $11 million to finance public improvements in a planned Colorado Springs residential and commercial development, Stetson
Hills.34 The purpose of both bonds was to reimburse the developer, AmWest Development I Limited Partnership (AmWest L.P.), for
the improvement costs. The bondholders in turn were to be repaid
from assessments that the developer was to receive from commercial builders or from a reserve fund.35 The bonds were secured by
"landowner assessment liens" covering approximately 250 acres and
272 acres for the 1986 and 1988 bond issues respectively. The
bonds' covenants stipulated that at all times the land subject to the
liens was to be worth at least 160% of the bonds' outstanding
principal and interest (160% test).36
One of the original owners of the property under development,
Roy I. Pring, sold some of the property to AmWest L.P., in which
he and his wife each held 17.5% interest, and to which Pring had
loaned five million dollars.37 For some time, Pring served as a
vice-president and director of AmWest Development Corporation
(AmWest), which was the sole general partner of AmWest. L.P.
Pring concurrently had an interest in AmWest and had loaned
money to it.38

32. See supra notes 10-31 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
34. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 969 F.2d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.

Ct. 1439 (1994).
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id.
Id. at 893.
Id. at 894.
Id. at 893-94.
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Central Bank served as the indenture trustee for both bond
issues, and in that capacity received an "updated" appraisal of the
land securing the 1986 loan, along with an appraisal of the land
that had been proposed to secure the 1986 bonds.3 9 Although this
theoretically "updated" appraisal suggested that the land values had
remained essentially "unchanged,"4 Central Bank soon "became
aware of serious concerns about the adequacy of the security for
the 1986 bonds and the accuracy of the [updated] appraisal."'"
That is, the 1986 bonds' senior underwriter conveyed his concern
that "the 160% test was not being met,"42 and that, given a decline in property values subsequent to the time that the now sixteen-month appraisal had been issued, "the Authority may have
given 'false or misleading certifications' of compliance with the
bond covenants."43 The underwriter then wrote another letter expressing the same concerns, and Central Bank investigated.'
Since Central Bank received conflicting information, its own
in-house appraiser reviewed the "updated" appraisal. Suggesting
that the appraisal was both methodologically flawed and outdated,
he urged Central Bank to conduct an independent review of the
appraisal.45 Worse still, a Central Bank trust officer calculated that
even according to the "updated" appraisal, the 160% test was not
being met.46 In view of all these warnings, Central Bank ordered
"that an independent review of the appraisal be conducted by a
different appraiser."'47
After a series of meetings in which AmWest's president exerted considerable pressure, Central Bank agreed to delay an independent review until approximately six months after the closing of the
1988 bond issue.4" During this period, Pring, who knew both that
39. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 960 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994).
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 960 F.2d 891, 894 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. In a letter to AmWest's President, Central Bank cited as its three reasons for
ordering an independent review: "(1) the comparable sales data was outdated; (2) the
methodology did not consider a bulk sale in a forced liquidation context; and (3) considering the local real estate market, the value appeared 'unjustifiably optimistic."' Id. at

895.
48. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 960 F.2d 891, 895 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
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the "updated" appraisal had been questioned and that AmWest
seemed to be facing serious cash-flow difficulties, said nothing. He
coincidentally received almost two million dollars from AmWest
L.P. as "payment due" for land purchases and interest for Pring's
loan to AmWest L.P.49
Less than a year later, after a new appraisal had begun, the
Authority refused to complete the appraisal process. ° The 1988
bond owners were thereupon notified that the Authority had technically defaulted." The Authority then completely defaulted on payments on the 1988 bonds.5" First Interstate Bank and Jack Naber,
who had purchased 2.1 million dollars of the 1988 bonds, then
proceeded to file a cause of action against Pring, the Authority,
two underwriters, and Central Bank.53 After the United States District Court for the District of Colorado granted the defendants'
motion for summary judgment, the bondholders appealed.'M The
Tenth Circuit held that both Pring and Central Bank had aided and
abetted the Authorty's Rule lOb-5 violation of concealing the
property's true value and issuing bonds linked to the false and
outdated land value.55
In judging whether Pring's "silence was accompanied by a
conscious or actual intent to assist the primary violation,"56 the
court applied the "personal benefit" test.57 It concluded that
"[p]laintiffs' evidence establishes that Pring had a substantial personal stake in the 1988 bond issue."58 As for the plaintiffs' aiding
and abetting claim against Central Bank, the Court of Appeals,
while "agree[ing] . . . that Central Bank owed plaintiffs no duty to
disclose,"59 found "the lack of duty ... not dispositive in this
case . . . [since] it is possible for an indenture trustee to be held

Ct. 1439 (1994).
49. Id. These payments were ostensibly, if not actually, for land purchases and for the
repayment of interest. Id. at 893.
50. Id. at 895.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. See Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439 (1994).
54. Id.
55. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 960 F.2d 891, 899 (10th Cir. 1992), rev'd, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994).
56. Id. See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
57. Pring, 960 F.2d at 899. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
58. Pring, 960 F.2d at 899. As the court pointed out, Pring expected to receive payment from the proceeds of the bond sale. See supra note 49.
59. Pring, 969 F.2d at 900.
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liable as an aider and abettor."' Rather, the court found that Central Bank's unprecedented decision to delay an independent appraisal after ordering one-even though it "knew that serious concerns
had been raised about the accuracy of the

. . .

updated apprais-

al,"'M and even though "it believed those concerns were credible" 6"--could support aiding and abetting liability on grounds of
recklessness. 3 That is, "the bank's knowledge of the alleged inadequacies of the ... updated appraisal could support a finding of
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care."' The
court similarly held that the decision to delay an independent appraisal after ordering one "raised a genuine issue of material fact
as to the element of substantial assistance," given that through just
such an appraisal, "the depleted collateral would have been discovered and plaintiffs' losses avoided. 65
V.

REVISIONISM CAST AS ORIGINALISM: THE SUPREME
COURT'S RATIONALE IN CENTRAL BANK

After acknowledging numerous federal court decisions establishing aiding and abetting liability in private actions under section
10(b) of the 1934 Act,' the Supreme Court argued that its "close
attention to the statutory text in defining the scope of conduct
prohibited by Section 10(b)"'67 had prompted " ourts and commentators [alike] . . . to question whether aiding and abetting liability

under Section 10(b) was still available."68 Most of the doubts
about the continued availability of aider and abettor liability under
Rule lOb-5 have emanated from a perceived shift in the Court's

60. Id. at 901. Central Bank had argued that because it was an indenture trustee, it
was liable, according to the terms of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, only for failing to
perform those duties set out in the indenture. Id. at 900.
61. Id. at 904.
62. Id. The court noted that precisely because Central Bank did give credence to these
concerns, it demanded that $2 million worth of additional property be added to the Security for the 1986 bond issue. As a result, the bank was particularly culpable; since it was
"preparing to be the indenture trustee for the 1988 bond issue," and since it knew, in that
capacity, that the 1988 bonds were about to be sold on the basis of collateral that, in
view of the "updated" appraisal's outdatedness, was entirely inadequate. Id.
63. Id.
64. First Interstate Bank v. Pring, 960 F.2d 891, 904 (10th Cir. 1992), revid, 114 S.
Ct. 1439 (1994).
65. Id.
66. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct 1439, 1444 (1994).
67. Id.
68. Id.
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position on just such liability in cases such as Musick, Peller &
Garrett v. Employers Insurance of Wausau.69 In that case, the
Court declared that it could "only infer how the 1934 Congress
would have addressed the issues [involving private liability] had
the 1Ob-5 action been included as an express provision in the 1934
Act."70
In so arguing, the Court conveniently ignored a number of its
own decisions in which it had accepted the notion of liability in
private actions under section 10(b), including its decisions in Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States7 and Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co.72 It concomitantly dismissed,
since it could not ignore, Congress' express delegation of authority
to the SEC to interpret section 10(b) by distinguishing between the
73
SEC's right to "bring administrative and injunctive proceedings"
and the rights of private plaintiffs, as specified in the Act, to pursue claims.74 The Court concurrently buried the evolution and interpretations of section 10(b) and Rule 1Ob-5 in an unnecessarily
compendious, and not entirely germane, chronicle.
The Central Bank Court listed the various requirements for a
Rule 1Ob-5 violation, including manipulation and deception 76 and
failure to speak when there is reliance, 77 but it begged the question in assuming that these requirements somehow preclude aiding
and abetting liability in private actions. In mooring its holding to a
"manipulation or deception" requirement,78 the Court appeared to
assume the possibility of aiding or abetting without also manipulating or deceiving.79 In most cases, it would seem that aiding and
abetting would indeed incorporate some element of manipulation or
69. 113 S. Ct. 2085 (1993) (holding that defendants in Rule lOb-5 action have right to
seek contribution as a matter of federal law).
70. Id. at 2089-90.
71. 406 U.S. 128, 150-54 (1972).
72. 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
73. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1445 (1994).
74. Id.
75. See id. at 1445-48. See, e.g., the Court's reference to its consideration of "whether
knowing participation in a breach of fiduciary duty is actionable under ERISA." Id. at
1447.
76. Id. at 1445-48.
77. Id. at 1449.
78. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1446 (1994) (citing Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 473 (1977) (holding that the "language of § 10b gives
no indication that Congress meant to prohibit any conduct not involving manipulation or
deception")).
79. Id. at 1448.
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deception, but the Court here wrongly implied that no liability for
aiding and abetting can be found in the absence of a primary violation consisting of manipulative or deceptive behavior. On the
facts of Central Bank, the bank did order a review, but procrastinated and postponed the review under heavy pressure. To the extent that it ordered the review, the bank could argue that it was not
deceiving anyone. However, because it knowingly delayed that
review in the face of damaging evidenSe concerning the
Authority's ability to meet its financial obligations, there is little
question that the bank aided and abetted the fraud perpetrated upon
the bondholders. Hence, on the facts of this case, the Court's distinction between "manipulation and deception" and "giving aid to a
person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act' '8 is as tortuous linguistically as it is legally.
Moreover, referring to decisions concerning "reliance"'" and
"duty to speak, ' 82" the Central Bank Court argued that "[w]ere we
to allow the aiding and abetting action proposed in this case, the
defendant could be liable without any showing that the plaintiff
relied upon the aider and abettor's statements or actions."83 The
Court failed to explain, however, in just what circumstances bondholders would not rely upon an indenture trustee, or in which an
indenture trustee would not have a duty toward the bondholders.
Despite its professed adherence to statutory "language," however, the Court seems to contravene both the letter and the spirit of
an Act that makes "unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ... [to employ] any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may proscribe."' The Court expressly said that giving a
degree of aid or comfort to parties directly or indirectly engaging
in proscribed activities is not itself an "indirect action" giving rise
to liability." That is, the Court stated that "aiding and abetting

80. Id. According to the Court, "[tihe proscription does not include giving aid to a
person who commits a manipulative or deceptive act. We cannot amend the statute to
create liability for acts that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive." Id.
81. Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 243 (1988) (involving transaction in which
trader relied upon corporation's materially misleading statement).

82. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980) (holding that printer's "markup man" trading on basis of inferences made from information available at job did not
have a duty to disclose).

83. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S.Ct. 1439, 1449 (1994).
84. 1934 Act § 10(b).
85. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1447.
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liability [as previously interpreted] reaches persons who do not
engage in the proscribed activities at all, but who give a degree of
aid to those who do. 86 Hence, according to the Court, aiding and
abetting is not itself a violation of Rule lOb-5 in private actions.
Arguably, however, such aid or comfort is itself an "indirect" violation when the word "indirect" is reasonably construed.
The implications of the Court's decision in fact belie its protestations about adhering to a "statutory" meaning of "indirect."87
Without the "aider and abettor" language as a guide, other courts
will find themselves in entirely uncharted territory as they attempt
to determine what constitutes "indirect deception and manipulation."88 In many instances, secondary participants, such as lawyers
or accountants issuing opinion letters, will have communicated
several times to the plaintiff. Other secondary participants will have
chosen to remain silent despite a fiduciary duty to the plaintiff, and
still others will have been in positions in which they might or
might not have a duty. In Gold v. DCL Inc. 9 the plaintiff complained that an accounting firm, Price Waterhouse, had been obligated to disclose the financial difficulties of a company that it had
audited, even though the firm had been "fired by [defendant] because of the parties' disagreement over the validity of the intended
[certification of financial condition]." 9 The court rejected this attempt to impose liability based on the firm's failure to disclose
financial information.9 Yet, thanks entirely to the Supreme
Court's insistence upon adhering to a formalistic interpretation of
the language of the 1934 Act, such heretofore innocent individuals
may now be found liable for a primary violation of Rule lOb-5.
Alternatively, without the mooring of "aider and abettor" liability,
courts will lack any frame of reference by which to classify such
individuals and will be tempted to let both themselves and the
defendants off the hook.
Moreover, in its highly selective legislative history of aiding
and abetting liability, the Court ignored judicial and legislative
assumptions alike. As Justice Stevens' dissent observed, "judges
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1448.
88. See id.
89. 399 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) (involving purchases by lawyer and investor of
stock in company involved in short-term leasing of computers).
90. Id. at 1128.
91. Id. at 1127 (holding that "the situation is utterly lacking in the kind of special
relationship which has heretofore imposed on auditors a duty of disclosure").
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closer to the times and climate of the 73rd Congress ... concluded that holding aiders and abettors liable was consonant with the
1934 Act's purpose to strengthen the antifraud remedies of the
common law."92 Indeed, the 1934 Act was precisely the type of
"remedial" legislation that the Supreme Court had insisted should
receive "a broader and more liberal interpretation than that to be
drawn from mere dictionary definitions of the words employed by
Congress."'93 By the same token, "[w]hen §10(b) was enacted, aiding and abetting liability was widely, albeit not universally, recognized in the law of torts and in state legislation prohibiting misrepresentation in the marketing of securities."' Above all, as Justice
Stevens noted in reference to previous decisions, including decisions of the Supreme Court, "[t]he courts' reliance on common law
tort principles in defining the scope of liability under § 10(b) was
by no means an anomaly."95 The Court also, in a decision involving conspirators rather than aiders and abettors, "recognized a
private right of action against secondary violators of a statutory
duty despite the absence of a provision explicitly covering
them."96
As a consequence of these legislative and judicial assumptions,
"[i]n hundreds of judicial and administrative proceedings in every
circuit in the federal system, the courts and the SEC have conclud92. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
93. Id. at 1457 (citing Piedmont & Northern Ry. v. ICC, 286 U.S. 299, 311 (1932)
(holding that railroad with trackage outside of cities and with national freight business is
not "inter-urban electric railway")).
94. Id. at 1456 (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 244 (3d ed. 1906) ("All
who actively participate in any manner in the commission of a tort, or who command, direct, advise, encourage, aid or abet its commission, are jointly and severally liable therefor.")).
95. Id. & n.2 (citing American Soc'y of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556, 565-74 (1982) (holding the organization accountable for antitrust
violations)).
96. Id. at 1459 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456
U.S. 353, 394 (1982) (involving action by investor in commodities future contracts against
his merchant and broker, and by speculators in futures contracts against New York Mercantile Exchange, in which plaintiffs alleged unlawful price manipulation that could have
been prevented through the Exchange's enforcement of its own rules. The Court held that
[h]aving concluded that exchanges can be held accountable for breaching their
statutory duties to enforce their own rules prohibiting manipulation, it necessarily follows that those persons who are participants in a conspiracy to manipulate the market in violation of those rules are also subject to suit by futures
traders who can prove injury from these violations.)).
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ed that aiders and abettors are subject to liability under § 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5."97 Even in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores,9" to which the majority refers at several points, the Court
held that the "longstanding acceptance by the courts" and
"Congress' failure to reject" the Birnbaum rule, which had been
announced in a landmark court of appeals decision," mandated
the Rule's retention." More to the point, "[i]n its comprehensive
revision of the Exchange Act in 1975, Congress left untouched the
sizeable body of case law approving aider and abettor liability in
private actions under Section 10 and Rule lOb-5."' t
The Court did concede, but then explained away, recent Congressional committee interpretations of section 10(b) that suggest it
encompasses aiding and abetting liability,' by stating that a later
Congress' interpretation does not prove statutory meaning.0 3 Yet,
in so arguing, the Court overlooked the obvious conclusion that the
only reason that Congress did not change the law is that it saw no
need, in view of the statute's language, to do so. Indeed, these
recent interpretations belie the Court's argument that "[lt is 'impossible to assert . . . that congressional failure to act represents
affirmative congressional approval of the [courts'] statutory interpretation. '
In order to overlook the vast legislative and judicial history
concerning aiding and abetting liability, the Central Bank Court
overlooked important unsettled issues in the case that had been

97. Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1455 (1994) (citing ARS. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE 10-B 5 § 40.02 (rev. ed.
1993)).
98. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
99. Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir. 1951).
100. Central Bank, 114 S. Ct. at 1457 (citing Blue Chip Stamps, 421 U.S. at 733).
101. Id. at 1458.
102. Id. at 1452 (citing H.R. Rep. 100-910, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 27-28 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6043, 6064-65; H.R. Rep. 98-106, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 10
(1983), reprinted in 1983 U.S.S.C.A.N. 592, 601).
103. Id.
104. Id. (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175, & n.1, (1989)
(quoting Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, 671-72
(1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
The Court was even-handed, however, in rejecting Central Bank's arguments concerning the failure to pass "aid-and-abet" legislation in 1957, 1959, and 1960; and by recognizing that "failed legislation proposals are 'a particularly dangerous ground on which to
rest an interpretation of a prior statute."' Id. (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v.
LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)).
NOLD
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addressed by both parties" 5 in its haste to overturn the long settled principles that both parties had taken for granted. In fact, the
Court went so far as to redraft the questions presented for review,
as neither side had questioned the availability of aider and abettor
liability in private actions." It has thus once again seized the
occasion to don an originalist mask in order to play a revisionist
role but in the process has forgotten who the players are.
The Court then threw out the specter of excessive and expensive litigation against companies and independent professionals
should it fail to act. In so arguing, the Court appeared to fear the
constraints on business advice by professionals apprehensive about
potential liability.0 7 However, the authority the Court cited was
against section 10(b) in general, not against aiding and abetting
liability in particular.' 8 In any event, its projections concerning
increased litigation are as chimerical as they are nonauthoritative.'" Moreover, the comfort that the Court derived in having
left open the possibility of causes of action against primary violators-whose violations are often difficult to prove, and against only
some of whom, as it acknowledges, it has allowed a cause of
action-is the comfort of having thrown out most of the baby with
the bath."0
VI.

CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

Action against aiders and abettors has constituted fifteen percent of the SEC's civil enforcement proceedings, and "elimination
of aiding liability would 'sharply diminish the effectiveness of
Commission actions.""" As Justice Stevens suggested, the majority holding will call into question even the SEC's ability to prosecute actions against aiders and abettors." Indeed, now that aiders
and abettors will no longer be liable in private actions, the tempta-

105. See supra notes 60-66 and accompanying text.
106. Central Bank v. Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1456-57 (1994).
107. Id. at 1454.
108. Id.
109. The Central Bank Court then briefly alluded to competing policy considerations,
which it did not specify, and which it subsumed under its professed uncertainty concerning congressional intentions in 1934. See id.
110. See id. The Court's stated that "there are likely to be multiple violators," id., but
the implication was that some will be subject to a cause of action, while others will not.
111.
Central Bank v. First Interstate Bank, 114 S. Ct. 1439, 1459 (1994) (quoting brief
for the SEC as amicus curiae 18).
112. Id.
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tions to test the law will become, in many instances, almost inexorable.
The effects of Central Bank will be worse still when coupled
with another recent Supreme Court decision, Harper v. Virginia
Department of Taxation."' In Harper, Justice Thomas, in sweeping language, proclaimed that
[w]hen this Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpretation of
federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all
cases still open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether such 4 events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.
Thus Central Bank will become a basis for exculpating not simply
future aiders and abettors, whose conduct will take them to the
very margins of the law, but also present aiders and abettors, who
were willing to break the law even when their activity was considered cause for liability under section 10b(5) of the 1934 Act.
Thanks to the Central Bank majority, the conduct of aiders and
abettors, entirely illegal at the time, will not be excused but rather
vindicated. The lesson that they will draw is not only that they
were right to break the law, but that the judicial system has rewarded them for doing' so. Indeed, they will be encouraged to
break the law even under the Central Bank Court's expansive
approach to participants in securities violations, since they have no
reason to think that the laws against primary violators are any
more stable than were the laws against aiders and abettors. At the
very least, individuals who were willing to aid and abet when it
was illegal will, a fortiori, be willing to do it when it is legal.
How could it be otherwise when the Court has inexplicably chosen
to depart as much from precedent as it has from the arguments that
the litigators presented before it?" 5
To be sure, the decision's defenders can suggest the possibility
that it will alleviate the confusion and injustices sometimes imposed upon accountants, lawyers, investment bankers, and various
other professionals, whose involvement in transactions subject to
section 10(b) liability was marginal at best, but who nonetheless

113. 113 S. Ct. 2510 (1993).
114. Id. at 2517.
115. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
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-had been classified as aiders and abettors." 6 Yet, by the same
token, courts had attempted to shield minor players from aider and
abettor liability under section 10(b). Thus, the court in In re Gas
Reclaimer, Inc. Securities Litigation"7 held that there was "no
evidence that . . . [a party's] relatively minor role . . . viewed in

isolation proximately caused plaintiffs' allegedly ill-advised investment ' ' and that "acts of procuring indemnity agreements, bond
applications, and primary insurance do not constitute
assistance."' " 9 Under the aiding and abetting standard, courts were
interested in manipulation and deception, 20 not in tangential involvement, but the new standard has the paradoxical effect of encumbering the tangential' in order to exempt the manipulative.
Hence, unlike the residents of Cervantes's Seville, who-to the
thief's disgust-wrongly believed that they would earn Heavenly
rewards despite their dissolute lives by performing religious rituals,

the securities violators of twentieth century America will correctly
realize that they can earn earthly rewards, precisely because of
their dissolute lives, by performing civil rituals. Their salvation will
come by pretending to aid and abet, when they are in fact actively
engaging in securities fraud.
JAMES

L. FUCHS

116. See IT v. Comfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 924 (2d Cir. 1980) ("One may indeed doubt
whether plaintiffs will be able to demonstrate actual knowledge on the part of . . . three
minor underwriters at a trial, but in the absence of a sufficiently supported motion for
summary judgment on this subject, a course still open to the underwriter defendants, they
are entitled to an opportunity to do this.").
117. 659 F. Supp. 493 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (finding that an accountant's preparation of a
compilation report without issuing opinion did not create duty to disclose).
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See SEC v. Senex Corp, 399 F. Supp. 497 (E.D. Ky. 1975) (holding that party's
"taciturnity intended to convey a particular-and erroneous-impression of the project's
financial outlook").
121. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.

